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INSURANCE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
DRUNK DRIVING CASES
INTRODUCTION
In view of the enormous volume of automobile accident
litigation and the increasing public outcry against automobile
operators who drink and drive,1 it is odd that more cases have
not addressed the question of whether punitive damages
should be assessed against a drunk driver for alcohol-related
injuries.2 The issue is one of special importance for the practi-
tioner, especially in light of the recent cases holding that in-
toxication of a defendant motorist is itself an adequate basis
for an award of punitive damages.3 Although the doctrine of
punitive damages presents an attractive avenue for litigation,
its viability as an appropriate legal remedy and the nature of
its underlying rationale continues to spur scholarly
controversy.4
In recent years the Wisconsin Supreme Court has at-
tempted to define the standard of conduct which permits an
award of punitive damages in a negligence action.5 The court
has not, however, addressed this issue in a drunk driving case.
This Comment will survey the history6 and examine the ra-
tionale behind the award of punitive damages in drunk driving
1. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (United States Supreme Court
refers to the increase in the drunk driving problem); see also Kraft, The Drive To Stop
the Drinker from Driving, 59 N.D.L. REV. 391, 391-92 (1983).
2. Cases addressing this issue are collected at Annot., 65 A.L.R.3D 656 § 2 (1975).
For a full discussion of the number ofjurisdictions awarding punitive damages against a
drunk driver, see infra note 40 and accompanying text.
3. See Annot., 65 A.L.R.3D 656 § 2.
4. See generally DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE
DAMAGES (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros eds. 1964); Ghiardi, The Case Against Punitive Dam-
ages, 8 FORUM 411 (1972); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 517 (1957); Note, California Supreme Court Permits Punitive Damages Claims
Against Intoxicated Driver, 2 WHITTIER L. REV. 775 (1980).
5. See, e.g., Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985); Wangen v.
Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
6. For a general discussion of the history of punitive damages, see J. GHIARDI & J.
KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE (1983) [hereinafter cited as
GHIARDI & KIRCHER]; Note, The Drunken Driver and Punitive Damages: A Survey of
the Case Law and the Feasibility of a Punitive Damage Award in North Dakota, 59
N.D.L. REV. 413, 415-16 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, North Dakota]; Note, Puni-
tive Damages and the Drunken Driver, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 117, 121-23 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as Note, Drunken Driver].
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cases. Also, it will review the current state of Wisconsin law in
this area. Finally, it will discuss insurance against punitive
damages in Wisconsin by considering the potential impact of
the recent Wisconsin decision of Brown v. Maxey in the con-
text of drunk driving.
I. RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES
References to punitive or exemplary damages appear as
early as 2000 B.C.7 In Day v. Woodworth8 a New Jersey court
became the first American court to instruct a jury in awarding
punitive damages. 9 Since that time punitive damages have
been recognized as an established maxim of American com-
mon law.
Most frequently cited as the purposes for punitive dam-
ages are punishment and deterrence of the defendant and
others who engage in similar conduct.10 These purposes,
although deluged with criticism from the defense bar," are
relevant to the current drunk driving problem.
Punitive damages punish drunk drivers even when crimi-
nal laws fail to. Undoubtedly, most drunk driving accidents
involving death or serious bodily injury are criminally prose-
cuted. However, many drunk driving incidents cause only mi-
nor personal injuries or property damage, and they only
7. The Babylonian law of restitution provided: "If a man steal an ox, or sheep, or
ass, or pig, or boat, from a temple or palace, he shall pay thirty-fold; if it be from a free
man he shall pay ten-fold." Code of Hammurabi § 8, reprinted in A. KOCOUREK & J.
WIGMORE, SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND PRIMITIVE LAW 387, 391 (1915).
Other references appear later in 14 B.C. in the Hittite Laws where recovery was
permitted for multiple theft. See J. SMrrH, THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF HEBREW
LAW 246 (1960). Analogous provisions exist in Judeo-Christian law. See, eg., Exodus
21:29, 22:1, 22:4, 22:9.
8. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851) (punitive damages awarded for breach of promise
to marry).
9. The Court held that:
It is a well-established principle of common law, that in actions of trespass and
all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inffict what are called exemplary,
punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of
his offense rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff.
Id. at 371.
10. Id. See also generally GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 6, §§ 2.02, 2.06; W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (1964) [hereinafter cited as W.
PROSSER]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment a (1979); Note, North
Dakota, supra note 6, at 416-17; Note, Drunken Driver, supra note 6, at 123.
11. See supra note 4.
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subject the defendant to a relatively small fine, suspended sen-
tence or traffic school.12 A civil claim and the availability of
punitive damages serve to punish a defendant for conduct
which is essentially unpunished by criminal law.
The second objective of punitive damages is deterrence.13
In a drunk driving setting, the punitive, or exemplary, award
serves as a reminder to the defendant, and others, that drink-
ing and driving warrants financial penalties. 14 In Taylor v. Su-
perior Court,5 the majority addressed the deterrence issue in
the drunk driving context, concluding: "[W]e discern no valid
reason whatever for immunizing the driver himself from the
exposure to punitive damages given the demonstrable and al-
most inevitable risk visited upon the innocent public by his
voluntary conduct as alleged in the complaint."' 6 The Taylor
court favored the assessment of punitive damages because it
recognized the extreme threat posed to the public by drunk
drivers. 7 Statistical evidence unquestionably supports the
majority's concerns," and although the effectiveness of exem-
plary awards as a deterrent factor has never been conclusively
proven,1 9 the threat that drunk driving poses to the general
public warrants at least the maintenance of the current avail-
able sanctions.
12. See Note, Drunken Driver, supra note 6, at 129.
13. See GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 6, § 2.06.
14. Those who oppose punitive damages argue that the general public is not de-
terred by punitive damages. These critics cite the high rate of recidivism among drunk
drivers in support of their contention. See Note, Drunken Driver, supra note 6, at 128.
Not only is it difficult to prove that punitive damages successfully deter undesirable
conduct, but critics also point out that deterrence is not an objective of tort law. See
DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 15 (1964).
15. 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979).
16. Id. at 897, 598 P.2d at 858, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697-98. The drunk driver, Taylor,
had previously caused a serious accident while intoxicated and had been convicted of
drunk driving on numerous occasions. Id. at 893, 598 P.2d at 855, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
695.
17. Id. at 899, 598 P.2d at 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
18. A high percentage of all highway fatalities are directly attributable to drunk
driving. See generally G. HALVERSON, STOP THE DRUNK DRIVER (1970); Crampton,
The Problem Of The Drinking Driver, 54 A.B.A. J. 995 (1968).
19. See generally GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 6, §§ 2.07, 2.09.
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II. EARLY CASES.
Wigginton's Administrator v. Rickert2° is an early case that
discusses drunk drivers and punitive damages. In Wigginton,
the defendant and his companions were drinking for several
hours prior to an accident.2 1 As they made their way to an-
other tavern, they collided with a street car,22 injuring two
passengers who brought an action against Wigginton's es-
tate.23 At trial the jury awarded the plaintiffs $4,000 in puni-
tive damages.24
The defendant's estate appealed and argued that the
number of drinks consumed was too remote and prejudicial to
determine the outcome of the case.25 Nevertheless, the court
stated the case was appropriate for an assessment of punitive
damages as Wigginton's conduct was wanton and reckless, in-
dicating a willful disregard for human life.26 The court se-
verely chastized the defendant's behavior:
[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that persons under the
influence of liquor are wholly unfit to operate automobiles
; they have no thought of their own safety, and appear
to be wholly possessed of a desire to run the machine as fast
as it can go, without any regard to the rights of other people
27
Wigginton was among the first of a long line of cases which
attempted to characterize the seriousness of the conduct of
one who drives after drinking. A majority of these cases hold
that mere proof that the defendant driver was intoxicated at
the time of the accident is sufficient to put the issue of punitive
damages before the jury.28 The minority position, however, is
20. 186 Ky. 650, 217 S.W. 933 (1920).
21. Id. at -, 217 S.W. at 934.
22. Id.
23. Id. at - 217 S.W. at 933.
24. Id. at -, 217 S.W. at 935.
25. Id. at -, 217 S.W. at 934.
26. Id. at - 217 S.W. at 936.
27. Id. at -, 217 S.W. at 934. For another early case awarding punitive damages
against a drunk driver, see Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60, 274 P. 639 (1929). The court
awarded $3,000 in punitive damages against the defendant for conduct that displayed a
reckless and willful disregard for human life. Id.
28. This view was adopted in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 com-
ment b (1979). In light of the recent number of cases this seems to represent a trend in
automobile accident litigation involving drunk drivers. See Note, Punitive Damages and
the Drunk Driver-An Untimely Decision, 12 CAP. U.L. REv. 271 (1982).
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that simply driving while intoxicated, without some evidence
of malice, ill-will, or evil motive, does not support an award of
punitive damages.2 9
III. THE MINORITY POSITION
The courts which follow the minority position, while often
acknowledging the fact that driving after drinking to the point
of intoxication is negligent and even reckless,3" hold that such
conduct will not support an award of punitive damages with-
out proof of malice on the part of the driver.31 These jurisdic-
tions require that the plaintiff allege and prove actual malice;
the result of this requirement is that punitive damages are sel-
dom awarded. 32 The language of the court in Baker v. Mar-
cus33 exemplifies the minority courts' characterization of
malice:
One who knowingly drives his automobile on the highway
under the influence of intoxicants, in violation of a statute,
is, of course, negligent. It is a wrong, reckless and unlawful
thing to do; but it is not necessarily a malicious act. Evi-
dence of intoxication may be offered to show the negligence
of a driver; but in the absence of proof of one or more of the
elements necessary to justify an award for punitive damages,
it may not be used to enlarge an award of damages beyond
that which will fairly compensate the plaintiff for the injury
suffered.34
Although many courts holding the minority view utilize
harsh language similar to that in Baker, some courts have rec-
ognized "that it is rarely possible to prove actual malice other-
29. The following jurisdictions represent the minority rule: American Sur. Co. v.
Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966); Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307
F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962); Commercial Union Ins. v. Reichard, 262 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.
Fla. 1966); Arnold v. State ex rel. Burton, 220 Ark. 25, 245 S.W.2d 818 (1952); Tedesco
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941); Yesel v. Watson, 58
N.D. 524, 226 N.W. 624 (1929); Teska v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 59 Misc. 2d 615, 300
N.Y.S.2d 375 (1969); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966).
30. See, e.g., Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 322 P.2d 933 (1958) (negli-
gence or gross negligence insufficient to justify an award of punitive damages).
31. See W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 2, at 9-10.
32. See Note, Drunken Driver, supra note 6, at 139. It is extremely difficult to
prove that a drunk driver intended to inflict the injury on the person who was harmed.
33. 201 Va. 905, 114 S.E.2d 617 (1960).
34. Id. at 909, 114 S.E.2d at 620.
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wise than by conduct and surrounding circumstances."35
Thus, some courts lessen the burden of proof and permit a
determination of malice to be implied from the circumstances:
"If it be wrongful, unlawful and intentional, and the natural
and probable result of the act is to accomplish the injury com-
plained of, 'malice' is implied."' 36 Even applying this more lib-
eral standard, it would be difficult to prove that the natural
and probable result of drinking and driving is to accomplish
an injury.
The minority's analysis demonstrates the extreme diffi-
culty facing an injured plaintiff when attempting to recover
punitive damages. The practitioner should take great pains to
be certain to make every possible nexus between the defend-
ant's intoxication and driving. Moreover, if at all possible, an
attempt should be made to prove actual malice, relying on
legal malice37 only in the alternative.
IV. THE MAIORITY POSITION
In a majority of jurisdictions, the courts have used a wide
variety of expressions to define the type or degree of negli-
gence which will permit an award of punitive damages against
a drunk driver. Although many older decisions allowed re-
covery of punitive damages without a thorough analysis of the
rationale, 38 the majority of juridictions permit awards of puni-
tive damages only where the defendant acts in wanton disre-
gard of the rights and safety of another.39 To prove that a
defendant's act was wanton or reckless the plaintiff must show
that the defendant knew, or should have known, that his con-
duct would create a high degree of risk of harm.4° There must
35. See, e.g., Davis v. Thunison, 168 Ohio St. 471, 475, 155 N.E.2d 904, 907 (1959).
36. Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 348, 98 N.E. 102, 108 (1912).
37. For a definition of legal malice, see BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 806 (5th ed.
1979).
38. See Note, Drunken Driver, supra note 6, at 132.
39. The following jurisdictions apply this rule: Giddings v. Zellan, 160 F.2d 585
(D.C. Cir. 1947); Smith v. Chapman, 115 Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 900 (1977); Mince v.
Butters, 200 Colo. 501, 616 P.2d 127 (1980); Walczewski v. Wright, 181 Ind. App. 615,
393 N.E.2d 228 (1979); Gesslein v. Britton, 175 Kan. 661, 266 P.2d 263 (1954); Smith
v. Sayles, 637 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Gelinas v. Mackey, 123 N.H. 690, 465
A.2d 498 (1983); Detling v. Chockley, 70 Ohio St. 2d 134, 436 N.E.2d 298 (1982);
Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 905, 114 S.E.2d 617 (1960).
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1979).
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also be an indication that the defendant deliberately acted or
failed to act in a conscious disregard of that risk.
In the Arkansas case of Miller v. Blanton,4 1 the court de-
termined the viability of the award on the basis of conduct
alone: "Miller. . . knew that he was taking into his stomach
a substance that would stupefy his senses, retard his muscular
and nervous reaction. . . . After Miller voluntarily rendered
himself unfit to operate a car properly he undertook to drive
his automobile . . . down a well traveled highway." 42 The
court in Miller emphasized the voluntariness of the defend-
ant's actions in retarding his senses and driving where there
existed a high degree of risk of harm to others.43 Most juris-
dictions that follow the majority rule characterize such con-
duct as so flagrant as to transcend mere negligence and
constitute outrageous and reckless behavior.44 This, however,
does not free the plaintiff from proving causation. Punitive
damages may be imposed only after the plaintiff establishes
that the defendant's intoxication proximately caused the re-
sulting accident and injuries.45
The California legislature has determined that the "con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of in-
juries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person."46 As a
result, an analysis of the feasibility of punitive damages in that
state focuses on the nature of the conduct rather than causa-
tion. A prominent California decision which demonstrates
the majority view is Taylor v. Superior Court.47 In Taylor, the
California Supreme Court held that the element of malice was
satisfied by showing that the defendant displayed a conscious
41. 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (1948).
42. Id. at 249, 210 S.W.2d at 294-95.
43. For a similar decision emphasizing the conduct of the defendant while driving
intoxicated in a crowded area, see Focht v. Robada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 41 n.1, 268 A.2d
157, 161 n.1 (1970) (an intoxicated driver speeding through a crowded thoroughfare is
clearly liable for punitive damages).
44. Focht, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A.2d 157. The Focht case followed the Restate-
ment rule: "If the conduct involved a high degree of chance that serious harm will
result, the fact that he knows or has reason to know that others are within the range of
its effect, is conclusive of his recklessness." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRm § 500
comment d (1979).
45. See Smith v. Chapman, 115 Ariz. 211, -, 564 P.2d 900, 904 (1977); Note,
North Dakota, supra note 6, at 428; Note, Drunken Driver, supra note 6, at 133-34.
46. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(b) (West 1985).
47. 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979).
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disregard of the safety of others.4 A conscious disregard ex-
ists when the defendant is "aware of the probable dangerous
consequences of his conduct, [but] he willfully and deliber-
ately fail[s] to avoid those consequences." 49
The court's approach stresses the foreseeability of the
harm that would follow from the act of drinking and driving:
One who wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point
of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a
motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical
and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and
speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disre-
gard of the safety of others.50
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Clark attacked the majority's
"twisted definition [of] malice" 51 which required no showing
of evil motive but only an indication that the defendant had an
awareness of the probable dangerous consequences of his act.
A second objection raised by Justice Clark was that punitive
damages serve no deterrent purpose.5 2 The defendant's posi-
tion was that punitive damages were assessed on a fortuitous
basis because, "[d]runk drivers not involved in accidents-
comprising the vast majority-are not subject to the penalty
[of punitive damages]. 53 This argument, however, com-
pletely ignores the discretion inherent in law enforcement. It
is true that the law has a discriminatory effect on violators
that are caught, but to abandon a form of recovery for the
victim on this basis violates the rights of the injured and un-
dermines the fundamental rationales of deterrence and
punishment.
48. Id. at 895, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696. The court quoted Prosser,
stating that punitive damages would be allowed when there are "circumstances of ag-
gravation or outrage, such as spite or 'malice,' or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part
of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others
that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton." Id. at 894-95, 598 P.2d at 856, 157
Cal. Rptr. at 696 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9-
10 (1964).
49. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 896-97, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
50. Id. at 896, 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr at 697.
51. Id. at 910, 598 P.2d at 866, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 706 (Clark, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 903, 909-10, 598 P.2d at 861, 865-66, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 705.
53. Id. at 903-04, 598 P.2d at 862, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
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V. ESTABLISHING LIABILITY FOR DRUNK DRIVING IN
WISCONSIN
The Wisconsin courts have not yet addressed the issue of
whether to award punitive damages in drunk driving cases.
Thus far the courts have relied on criminal sanctions to penal-
ize such conduct. 4 In addition to the criminal statutes, Wis-
consin courts permit an injured plaintiff to pursue a cause of
action for negligence. The following analysis will focus first
upon the elements that the plaintiff in a drunk driving case
must prove to establish actual damages in tort. Second, it will
predict the requisite type of conduct that would support an
award of punitive damages in a drunk driving case.
A. Liability in Tort
Before a jury may award punitive damages in Wisconsin,
the plaintiff must prove that he or she has suffered actual
damages and that such damages were not merely nominal.5 5
To establish actual damages in a cause of action for negli-
gence, the plaintiff must prove four basic elements: duty,
breach, cause, and harm. 6In drunk driving cases, proving a
breach of duty requires the injured party to show that an ordi-
narily prudent person would not voluntarily imbibe a danger-
ous substance knowing of the potential risks. An actionable
negligence claim also requires a plaintiff to prove that the de-
fendant's negligent act proximately caused the plaintiff's re-
sulting injuries. Damages based upon evidence of intoxication
alone would be unconstitutional because they would punish a
54. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 940.09(1) (1983-84).
55. Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 136, 140, 279 N.W.2d
503, 505 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 97 Wis. 2d 136, 293 N.W.2d 897 (1980);
Widemshek v. Fale, 17 Wis. 2d 337, 117 N.W.2d 275 (1962).
56. See W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 30; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 281 (1965); see also Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 531, 247 N.W.2d
132, 135 (1976); Thomas v. Kells, 53 Wis. 2d 141, 144, 191 N.W.2d 872, 873-74 (1971).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has summarized that:
[t]o constitute a cause of action for negligence there must be: (1) A duty to
conform to a certain standard of conduct to protect others against unreasonable
risks; (2) a failure to conform to the required standard; (3) a causal connection
between the conduct and the injury; and (4) actual loss or damage as a result of
the injury.
Thomas, 53 Wis. 2d at 144, 191 N.W.2d at 873-74.
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defendant simply for being drunk.5 7 In Wisconsin if a duty
and a breach are present the defendant is liable for all conse-
quential damages flowing from the breach, whether or not the
damages were foreseeable and provided there was no break in
the chain of causation.18 In Wisconsin only public policy lim-
its liability for damages proximately caused by a negligent
act.5 9
In Ayala v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 6
the Wisconsin Supreme Court detailed the public policy bal-
ance between evidence of intoxication and proof that such in-
toxication was a substantial factor in producing a given
accident:
Intoxication, standing by itself, does not constitute either
gross negligence or ordinary negligence. While a person's
driving of a motor vehicle when intoxicated is prohibited by
statute, and is a criminal offense, nevertheless, an intoxicated
driver of a motor vehicle may become involved in a collision
and yet be free from negligence, and, therefore, not liable to
respond in damages. . .. However, when there is concur-
rence of intoxication and causal negligence as to items such
as speed, management and control, position on the highway,
lookout, etc., the same constitutes gross negligence.61
The language of Ayala indicates that evidence of intoxica-
tion by itself will not satisfy the element of causation. It must
be coupled with the defendant's irregular or abnormal driving.
The reasoning of Ayala is that intoxication dulls the senses;62
dulled senses result in abnormal driving; abnormal driving
leads to automobile collisions.63
57. See Note, Drunken Driver, supra note 6, at 118 n.2.
58. Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 236, 234 N.W. 272, 377 (1931). Wis-
consin has eliminated all elements of foreseeability from the determination of proximate
cause or substantial factor in negligence cases. See Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co., 16
Wis. 2d 421, 428-29, 114 N.W.2d 823, 827 (1962); see also Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway
Theater, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 234-35, 55 N.W.2d 29, 32 (1952).
59. Osborne, 203 Wis. at 237, 234 N.W. at 378.
60. 272 Wis. 629, 76 N.W.2d 563 (1956).
61. Id. at 640, 76 N.W.2d at 570.
62. It has been suggested that legal intoxication alone does not necessarily indicate
that the defendant's senses were so impaired as to be incapable of driving competently.
Some habitual drinkers remain unimpaired with blood-alcohol content levels as high as
.10%. See Zylman, Hostile Drivers and Alcohol Don't Mix, 12 TRIAL 60 (Oct. 1976).
63. See Note, Drunken Driver, supra note 6, at 135.
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B. Liability for Punitive Damages.
Once liability for actual damages in tort has been estab-
lished, the question becomes what kind of conduct is likely to
justify an award of punitive damages for injuries sustained by
another as a result of a collision with a drunk driver. This
issue has never been addressed in Wisconsin, but an answer
can be reached by applying recent Wisconsin case law on pu-
nitive damage awards, Wangen v. Ford Motor Co. 64 and Brown
v. Maxey,65 to the drunk driving context.
Wisconsin courts have long held that in order for the
plaintiff to recover punitive damages there must be some evi-
dence indicating that the wrong was inflicted "under circum-
stances of aggravation, insult, or cruelty, with vindictiveness
and malice."' 66 Wisconsin has allowed punitive damages for
various intentional torts, including assault and battery,67 slan-
der,68 libel,69 conversion,70 and malicious prosecution.71 More
recently, punitive damages have been awarded in products lia-
bility cases72 and in negligence cases.73
A discussion of the type of conduct that is sufficient to
permit an award of punitive damages for drunk driving must
begin with a brief discussion of Bielski v. Schulze.74 Bielski
abolished the type of conduct formerly characterized as gross
negligence, stating:
We recognize the abolition of gross negligence does away
with the basis for punitive damages in negligence cases. But
punitive damages are given, not to compensate the plaintiff
for his injury, but to punish and deter the tortfeasor, and
were acquired by gross negligence as accoutrements of inten-
tional torts. Wilful and intentional torts, of course, still ex-
64. 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
65. 124 Wis. 2d 426, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985).
66. Christensen v. Schwartz, 198 Wis. 222, 227, 223 N.W. 839, 840 (1929) (quoting
McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424, 431 (1854)).
67. Jones v. Fisher, 42 Wis. 2d 209, 166 N.W.2d 175 (1969).
68. Lisowski v. Chenenoff, 37 Wis. 2d 610, 155 N.W.2d 619 (1968).
69. Dalton v. Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 188 N.W.2d 494 (1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 934 (1972).
70. Fahrenberg v. Tengel, 96 Wis. 2d 211, 234, 291 N.W.2d 516, 527 (1980).
71. Walbrun v. Berkel, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
72. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980); Collins v.
Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984).
73. Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985).
74. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
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ist, but should not be confused with negligence .... The
protection of the public from such conduct or from reckless,
wanton, or wilful conduct is best served by the criminal laws
of the state.7
5
The language used by the court suggests that punitive dam-
ages are inappropriate in negligence cases. However, both
commentary 76 and case law77 agree that where the conduct of
the defendant amounts to "what was formerly categorized as
gross negligence; that is, where the defendant has acted in
wanton, wilful or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights,
78
punitive damages can still be recovered. In Wangen v. Ford
Motor Co.,79 however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court put the
confusion of Bielski to rest.
Wangen expressly referred to the language in Bielski re-
garding reckless conduct as dicta80 and then proceeded to de-
fine the type of conduct for which punitive damages may be
awarded in products liability and negligence cases in
Wisconsin:
Because punitive damages depend on the nature of the
wrongdoer's conduct, not on the nature of the tort on which
compensatory damage is based, we interpret the dicta in
Bielski to mean that punitive damages are not recoverable if
the wrongdoer's conduct is merely negligent. Punitive dam-
ages do not rise from negligence. Nor does every products
75. Id. at 18, 114 N.W.2d at 113.
76. See Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical Analysis: Kink v. Combs,
49 MARQ. L. REV. 369, 374 (1965). This commentary refers to the Bielski dicta as
follows:
Because gross negligence involved a willful and wanton disregard of the rights of
the plaintiff, one could argue that since the concept of gross negligence has been
abolished, punitive damages can no longer be recovered in negligence cases. In
the Bielski decision the Court used language to this effect. Although the Court
set forth the classic argument against punitive damages therein, it is unlikely that
the court intended to restrict punitive damages to intentional torts exclusively.
It is likely that punitive damages are still available in negligence cases where
defendant's conduct was willful and wanton.
Id. (footnotes omitted)
77. See Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 101 n.4, 267
N.W.2d 595, 600 n.4 (1978); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d at 272-73, 294
N.W.2d at 445-46.
78. Ghiardi, Punitive Damages in Wisconsin, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 753, 758 (1960).
79. 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437. For a more recent case permitting a reward
of punitive damages in a products liability action, see Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis.
2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984).
80. Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 272, 294 N.W.2d at 444.
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liability case give rise to punitive damages. Only where
there is proof of malice or willful, wanton, reckless disregard
of plaintiff's rights can punitive damages be considered.81
Furthermore, the court clearly stated that "malice or vindic-
tiveness [were] not the sine qua non of punitive damages, 82
but, rather, conduct which could appropriately be described
as "outrageous" 8 3 would be sufficient to warrant the assess-
ment of punitive damages. Therefore, irrespective of the ab-
sence of a malicious or evil intent, punitive damages are
permitted when the character of the offense has the outra-
geousness associated with a serious crime.8 4
Although there may be some confusion as to whether the
pre-Bielski conduct formerly characterized as gross negligence
is the same as that articulated in Wangen, the distinction is
immaterial. The Wangen court seems to equate "outrageous"
conduct with "gross negligence,"' 5 thereby suggesting that if
there is a distinction, it has little relevance when analyzing the
appropriate conduct for punitive damages. Thus, while the
particular language used by courts may differ, the nature of
the conduct appears to be the same. Once it is recognized that
the pre-Bielski conduct constituting gross negligence is funda-
mentally the same as the "outrageous" standard of conduct
enunciated by the Wangen court, the only remaining inquiry
relevant to this Comment is whether or not the act of drinking
and driving exhibits a wanton or reckless disregard of the
plaintiff's rights. A number of pre-Bielski cases demonstrate
that it does.8 6
81. Id. at 275, 294 N.W.2d at 446. See also Brown, 124 Wis. 2d at 433, 369 N.W.2d
at 681.
82. Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 274, 294 N.W.2d at 446 (quoting Kink, 28 Wis. 2d at
79, 135 N.W.2d at 797).
83. Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 268, 294 N.W.2d at 442.
For an analogous standard of conduct, see Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 40,
268 A.2d 157, 160 (1970) ("outrageous conduct" done with "reckless indifference to the
interests of others").
84. See Entzminger v. Ford Motor Co., 47 Wis. 2d 751, 758, 177 N.W.2d 899, 903
(1970); see also Jones v. Fisher, 42 Wis. 2d 209, 219, 166 N.W.2d 175, 180 (1969).
85. Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 275, 294 N.W.2d at 446.
86. See, e.g., Twist v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 275 Wis. 174, 81 N.W.2d 523
(1957); Ayala v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 272 Wis. 629, 76 N.W.2d 563 (1956);
State v. Peckham, 263 Wis. 239, 56 N.W.2d 835 (1953); Christie v. State, 212 Wis. 136,
248 N.W. 920 (1933); Tomasik v. Lanferman, 206 Wis. 94, 238 N.W. 857 (1931).
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An early drunk driving case, Tomasik v. Lanferman,8 7 sus-
tained a trial court finding of gross negligence. In that case, a
pedestrian was struck by a milk wagon which itself had been
struck by a drunk driver.88 The court, relying on circumstan-
tial evidence of the defendant's intoxication, held that "the
driving of a car upon our highways by one intoxicated fully
responds to all of the elements necessary to constitute gross
negligence."8 9 Without any discussion of malice the court
said that one who drives a car while intoxicated "betrays an
absence of any care, and indicates such recklessness and wan-
tonness as evinces an utter disregard of consequences." 90 This
language is nearly identical to that used in Wangen. More-
over, the tenor of the decision suggests that the conduct of the
driver approached the level of outrageousness associated with
serious crime. 91
Another prominent decision which discussed the type of
conduct exhibited by a drunk driver is Ayala v. Farmers Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Co. 92 In Ayala the jury found that
the driver was intoxicated at the time of the collision and was
negligent as to position on the highway, management and con-
trol, and lookout. Ironically, they also found that his intoxica-
tion was not a causal factor.93 The court, having difficulty
with the jury finding, stated that intoxication could not be dis-
associated from negligence. 94  More specifically, the court
stated that "[tihe finding of causal negligence coupled with the
finding of intoxication is, as a matter of law, in effect, a finding
of causal gross negligence. ' '95
The rationale the Ayala court forwards is fundamentally
sound. Highway travelers have a right to be free from the
87. 206 Wis. 94, 238 N.W. 857 (1931).
88. Id. at 95, 238 N.W. at 857.
89. Id. at 97, 238 N.W. at 858.
90. Id.
91. Tomasik was, in fact, applied in a negligent homicide case. See State v.
Peckman, 263 Wis. 239, 56 N.W.2d 835 (1953).
92. 272 Wis. 629, 76 N.W.2d 563 (1956).
93. Id. at 640, 76 N.W.2d at 570. The facts of the case suggest that the jury was
influenced by the defendant's having consumed only two cans of beer over the duration
of at least one and one half hours. Id. at 636, 76 N.W.2d at 567.
94. Id. at 640, 76 N.W.2d at 570. The court did not mean that the jury could not
find intoxication without finding negligence. Such a conclusion would remove the ele-
ment of proximate cause. Id.
95. 272 Wis. at 640, 76 N.W.2d at 570.
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erratic and abnormal behavior of a drunk driver. One way of
facilitating that end is to hold the defendant liable not only for
the actual damages incurred by the plaintiff but also for an
additional punitive award commensurate with the conduct of
the defendant that exceeds ordinary negligence. 96 The impli-
cation is that causal negligence, coupled with proof of intoxi-
cation, is an indication of more than simply a failure to use
due care. It demonstrates conduct appropriately deemed out-
rageous. Such conduct, according to the Wangen rule, war-
rants imposition of punitive damages. Therefore, an
examination of the language in Wangen, in relation to the pre-
Bielski characterization of drunk driving, indicates that Wis-
consin will permit punitive damages for injuries sustained to
another from a drunk driver. In order to be awarded exem-
plary damages, the plaintiff must simply establish that the de-
fendant was causally negligent and that he was intoxicated at
the time of the collision. When these two elements are met,
the "reckless conduct" standard of Wangen should be applied
as a matter of law.
VI. INSURING AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
The issue of whether or not punitive damages assessed
against a drunk driver are insurable is as important as the
threshold determination of whether punitive damages should
even be available. In addressing this issue, courts generally
consider two questions: First, is the language of the insurance
contract sufficiently broad to cover such damages; second,
should public policy permit coverage? The recent decision in
Brown v. Maxey97 has answered both of these questions in the
affirmative. Unfortunately, Maxey is decided primarily on the
basis of insurance contract principles. The arguably more sig-
nificant public policy implications are not adequately dis-
cussed. Because the availability of insurance against punitive
damages has the effect of shifting the direct responsibility for
the act of drinking and driving to the general public, the un-
96. The court stated in an early portion of the decision that "[o]rdinary negligence
and gross negligence are distinct kinds of negligence, and do not grade into each other.
Ordinary negligence lies in the field of inadvertence, and gross negligence in the field of
actual or constructive intent to injure." Id. at 637, 76 N.W.2d at 568.
97. 124 Wis. 2d 426, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985).
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derlying objectives of punishment and deterrence are seriously
jeopardized.
A. Contractual Interpretation
An analysis of the insurability of punitive damages must
begin with the language of the insurance policy itself. As a
matter of contractual interpretation the majority of jurisdic-
tions agree that the terms of the general liability policy permit
coverage against punitive damages.98 Most courts find the
typical policy to be either broad enough to cover such dam-
98. The following cases have held that the typical liability policy provides coverage
against punitive damages: Pennsylvania Threshermen and Farmers' Mut. Casualty Ins.
Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957); General Casualty Co. v. Woodby, 238
F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th
Cir. 1943); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert
denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935); Norfolk and Western Ry. v. Hartford Accident and In-
dem. Co., 420 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345
F. Supp. 1090 (D. Me. 1972); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16
(S.D. Cal. 1943); Capital Motor Lines v. Loring, 238 Ala. 260, 189 So. 897 (1939);
American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935); Price v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972); Southern Farm
Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969); Abbie
Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d
783 (1973); Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Baker, 304 Ky. 296, 200 S.W.2d 757 (1947); Anthony v.
Frith, 394 So. 2d 867 (Miss. 1981); Fitzgerald v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 679 P.2d 790
(Mont. 1984); Wolff v. General Casualty Co., 68 N.M. 292, 361 P.2d 330 (1961); Day-
ton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155 (Okla. 1980); Har-
rell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977); Morrell v. Lalonde, 45
R.I. 112, 120 A. 435 (1923); Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965);
Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964);
Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972);
Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co. 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981). The following cases have held
that the general public liability policy does not provide coverage for punitive damages:
American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966); Northwestern Nat'l Casu-
alty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.
Reichard, 262 F. Supp. 275 (S.D. Fla. 1966), vacated, 273 F. Supp. 952 (1967); Ameri-
can Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257 (D. Conn. 1965); Hanna v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 233 F. Supp. 510 (E.D.S.C. 1964); Arnold v. State ex rel. Burton, 220
Ark. 25, 245 S.W.2d 818 (1952); Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39
P.2d 776 (1934); Brown v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., - Colo. App. -, 484 P.2d
1252 (1971); Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941);
Nicholson v. American Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964); Yesel v. Watson, 58 N.D. 524,
226 N.W. 624 (1929); Teska v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 59 Misc. 2d 615, 300 N.Y.S. 2d
375 (1969); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966); Laird v. Na-
tionwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
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ages or sufficiently ambiguous to resolve coverage against the
insurer.99
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Brown v. Maxey1°° con-
sidered the insurability of punitive damages assessed against a
landlord for failure to maintain his apartment complex rea-
sonably fire-safe. 10 1 The court concluded that the standard li-
ability policy language was sufficiently broad; therefore, the
insured could reasonably have expected to be covered for such
damages.10 2
If the policy in Maxey had specifically excluded coverage
for punitive damages, the court would not have addressed the
reasonable expectations of the insured. It was evident, how-
ever, that the insurance company in Maxey was simply trying
to benefit from its own ambiguity. Implicit in the court's
holding is a warning to insurers that they may exclude puni-
tive damages by policy language. For the exclusionary provi-
sion to be effective it must be definite and express, leaving no
ambiguity in its application. Furthermore, the court will not
permit an insurer to exclude coverage for punitive damages by
characterizing "outrageous" conduct as intentional.103
B. Public Policy
One of the earliest cases referring to public policy is the
Colorado case of Universal Indemnity Insurance Co. v.
Tenery. 04 The court, while never expressly addressing the is-
sue of public policy, indicated a concern for the objectives of
punitive damages. The court stated that because the insur-
ance company agreed to provide coverage only for bodily inju-
99. See generally Burrell & Young, Insurability of Punitive Damages, 62 MARQ. L.
REV. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Burrell & Young, Insurability]. A typical policy
generally provides coverage for "all sums which the insured shall become obligated to
pay by reason of liability imposed by law." See also Note, Insurance for Punitive Dam-
ages: A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 436 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Insurance Reevaluation].
100. 124 Wis. 2d 426, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985).
101. Id. at 441-47, 369 N.W.2d at 685-88.
102. Id. at 442, 369 N.W.2d at 685 (emphasis added). The Maxey court noted two
reasons that indicated why the policy language was not ambiguous with respect to puni-
tive damages: the term "damages" was sufficiently broad to cover for both compensa-
tory and punitive damages, and punitive damages were awarded "because of bodily
injury."
103. See Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d at 444, 369 N.W.2d at 686.
104. 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934).
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ries and because punitive damages are assessed on the basis of
punishment, "[T]he injured [party] will not be allowed to col-
lect from a non-participating party for a wrong against the
public. 10
5
The leading case prohibiting coverage for punitive dam-
ages by an insurance company is Northwestern National Casu-
alty Co. v. McNulty.10 6 The defendant, insured under a policy
issued in Virginia, lost control of his car while intoxicated.
The plaintiff suffered severe injuries and brought suit for com-
pensatory and punitive damages in Florida where the accident
had occurred. The plaintiff was awarded a total of $57,000,
including $20,000 in punitive damages. The insurance com-
pany appealed, protesting the liability for punitive damages.
Judge Wisdom premised his decision on the public policy be-
hind punitive damages:
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment
he gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the es-
tablishment of sanctions against such misconduct. It is not
disputed that insurance against criminal fines or penalties
would be void as violative of public policy. The same public
policy should invalidate any contract of insurance against
the civil punishment that punitive damages represent.
The policy considerations in a state where, as in Florida
and Virginia, punitive damages are awarded for punishment
and deterrence, would seem to require that the damages rest
ultimately as well as nominally on the party actually respon-
sible for the wrong. If that person were permitted to shift
the burden to an insurance company, punitive damages
would serve no useful purpose. Such damages do not com-
pensate the plaintiff for his injury since compensatory dam-
ages already have made the plaintiff whole. And there is no
point in punishing the insurance company; it has done no
wrong. In actual fact, of course, and considering the extent
to which the public is insured, the burden would ultimately
come to rest not on the insurance companies but on the pub-
lic, since the added liability to the insurance companies
would be passed along to the premium payers. Society
would then be punishing itself for the wrong committed by
the insured.10 7
105. Id. at 17, 39 P.2d at 779.
106. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
107. Id. at 440-41.
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As the McNulty decision clearly indicates, if one rationale of
punitive damages is to punish the drunk driver, permitting in-
surance coverage of the award severs the direct responsibility
of the wrongdoer from his actions and shifts the punishment
to the insurer.
Juxtaposed against McNulty is the leading case permitting
insurance coverage against punitive damages. Lazenby v. Uni-
versal Underwriters Insurance Co. 108 involved a plaintiff who
sustained personal injuries as the result of a collision with a
negligent drunk driver. The Supreme Court of Tennessee
found the insurer liable for punitive damages and then went
on to question the viability of deterrence as an appropriate
objective of punitive damages:
We. . . are not able to agree [that] the closing of the insur-
ance market, on the payment of punitive damages, to [so-
cially irresponsible] drivers would necessarily accomplish
the result of deterring them in their wrongful conduct. This
State, in regard to the proper operation of motor vehicles,
has a great many detailed criminal sanctions, which appar-
ently have not deterred this slaughter on our highways and
streets. Then to say the closing of the insurance market, in
the payment of punitive damages, would act to deter guilty
drivers would in our opinion contain some element of
speculation.109
Not only did the Lazenby court take issue with the effective-
ness of deterrence as an objective, but it also stated that denial
of coverage on public policy grounds would be arbitrary be-
cause of the difficulty involved in distinguishing between ordi-
nary negligence and negligence which justifies an award of
punitive damages.' 10
As stated above, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held in
Maxey that the wording of a liability policy may be suffi-
ciently broad to cover punitive damages.111 In addressing the
second, and perhaps more significant query of whether public
policy precludes coverage, the court emphasized the impor-
tance of maintaining freedom of contract:
108. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964). See also Long, Insurance Protection
Against Punitive Damages, 32 TENN. L. REV. 573 (1965).
109. Lazenby, 214 Tenn. at 648, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
110. Id.
111. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d at 443, 369 N.W.2d at 686.
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'Public policy' is no magic touchstone. This state has more
than one public policy. Another and countervailing public
policy favors freedom of contract, in the absence of overrid-
ing reasons for depriving the parties of that freedom. Still
another public policy favors the enforcement of insurance
contracts according to their terms, where the insurance com-
pany accepts the premium and reasonably represents or im-
plies that coverage is provided." 2
In addition, the Maxey court emphasized that insurance
against punitive damages could function as a successful deter-
rent in four ways: the defendant's premiums may rise; insur-
ance coverage may become unavailable; the punitive award
may exceed the policy coverage; and his reputation in the
community may be injured. 113 For these reasons, the court
believed that the rationale for punitive damages would not be
undermined.
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF BROWN V. MAXEY
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision to allow insura-
bility of punitive damages had, as its foundation, the question
of whether to adopt the reasoning of Lazenby or that of Mc-
Nulty. Both cases dealt with punitive damages within the
drunk driving context, and both cases addressed the insurabil-
ity issue on public policy grounds. However, Lazenby stands
for the proposition that coverage should be based on the rea-
sonable expectations of the insured, whereas McNulty holds
112. Id. at 446, 369 N.W.2d at 687 (quoting Cieslewicz v, Mutual Serv. Casualty
Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d at 91, 267 N.W.2d 595, 601 (1978).
Also consistent with the court's holding in Cieslewicz, the Maxey court refused to
interfere with the bargaining process between the insurer and the insured. The court
stated that the insurer has an option either to exclude coverage for punitive damages or
to collect a premium as sufficient consideration for such coverage. When the parties
arrive at an agreement and exchange sufficient consideration, the resulting contract will
be enforced unless the court finds an overriding public policy reason not to enforce it.
The countervailing public policy that the court faced was whether insurance coverage
would defeat the purpose of punitive damages. The court indicated that both deterrence
and punishment, the objectives of punitive damages, would remain intact after their
decision. In reaching the conclusion that public policy favors insurance coverage for
punitive damages, the Maxey court, citing Cieslewicz, relied on a very basic, but often
contested, rationale: "[I]nsurance does not necessarily shift the burden from the indi-
vidual. . . to the general public but simply spreads the burden out among similarly
situated persons, while avoiding the devastating financial impact on particular individu-
als." Id. at 446, 369 N.W.2d at 688.
113. Id. at 447, 369 N.W.2d at 688.
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that insurability would defeat the purpose of punitive dam-
ages. The Maxey decision applied the "reasonable expecta-
tion" theory and thereby followed the Lazenby line of cases.
The remainder of this Comment will attempt to demonstrate
the logical inconsistency of the Lazenby rule and the Maxey
decision with respect to drunk driving cases.
In nearly every decision holding that punitive damages are
insurable, the reasonable expectation of the insured is consid-
ered a major factor in the determination. 114 Those that favor
coverage argue that the average insured expects protection
against any claims caused by operation of a motor vehicle,
provided that such claims arise out of unintentional actions.1 15
An analogous assertion was made in Maxey, wherein the
court showed deferrence to the policy of upholding insurance
coverage after the insured has paid a premium. 116 There are
several reasons why this argument should not apply to the in-
sured drunk driver. First, the "reasonable expectation" the-
ory is more closely akin to a method of contractual
interpretation than a public policy argument. The theory is
most frequently used to decide what terms a reasonable per-
son would expect to be included in a contract.11 7 Understand-
ing the theory as a basic contract construction method, one
can see that the fault with the argument lies in its failure to
adequately address public policy.
Second, it is doubtful that a reasonable person would ex-
pect to be covered when causing injuries to another while
driving under the influence. If coverage is expected there are
reasons why these expectations should not be met. It is clear
that one should reasonably expect to be protected for harm
caused to another by ordinary negligence, since the unguarded
conduct of the tortfeasor lacks the sufficient mens rea associ-
ated with a serious crime. But as noted earlier in this Com-
114. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487-88, 502
P.2d 522, 524-25 (1972); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 239,
248, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1964); Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d
91, 97, 267 N.W.2d 595, 598 (1978).
116. Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 447, 369 N.W.2d 677, 688 (1985).
117. See Kremers-Urban Co. v. American Employers Ins., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 735-
36, 351 N.W.2d 156, 163-64 (1984) (court discusses reasonable expectations of insured
as a method of contract construction).
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ment, there is considerable variance in the characterization of
the conduct attributed to a drunk driver.
In Wisconsin the conduct of one who drinks and drives is
equivalent to what was formerly characterized as gross negli-
gence; that is, it constitutes a wanton, wilful and reckless dis-
regard for the rights of the plaintiff. Such conduct "falls short
of being intentional but probably is closer to intentional than
negligent action."' 18 In fact, some courts go so far as to imply
malice from mere evidence of injuries caused by an intoxi-
cated driver.119 Irrespective of the language used to define
drunk driving, it is evident that when a person voluntarily im-
bibes a mind altering substance into his system, while having
full knowledge that he must later drive a vehicle, he has ar-
guably met the requisite mens rea associated with a serious
crime. Indeed, the conduct involved in drunk driving cases
rises well above ordinary negligence and is more closely akin
to intentional wrongdoing.
The third reason why drunk drivers' expectations of insur-
ance coverage should not-be determinative of public policy in-
volves the effect of such coverage on deterring future conduct.
One court has stated that denying insurance coverage for pu-
nitive damages would not act to deter the wrongful conduct of
the driver.120 This court reached its conclusion by stating that
since criminal sanctions had not deterred drunk driving, it
would be speculative to say that punitive damages could have
any deterrent effect.121 The Maxey court implicitly adopted
the same reasoning.122
This argument, however, has been successfully countered
in the decision of American Surety Co. v. Gold: 23
[W]e may as well say criminal sanctions serve no useful pur-
pose just because they are constantly violated. The question
is not so much the efficacy of the policy underlying punitive
damages; rather it is a question of the implementation of that
118. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d at 450, 369 N.W.2d at 690 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
119. See generally Annot., 65 A.L.R.3D 656, § 2 (1975). See also supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
120. Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 648, 383 S.W.2d
1, 5 (1964).
121. Id.
122. 124 Wis.2d at 445, 369 N.W.2d at 687.
123. 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966).
19861
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
policy. Permitting the penalty for the misdeed to be levied
on one other than he who committed it cannot possibly im-
plement the policy.124
As the Gold court indicated, permitting the payment of puni-
tive damages to be shifted to a non-participant undermines the
deterrent function of the award.
The same contention can be made for the objective of pun-
ishment. Wisconsin has recognized the public policy of deter-
rence and punishment as the purposes of punitive damages.
When the penalty for drunk driving is unfairly shifted to the
insurance company, the defendant is no longer directly pun-
ished for the injuries caused. Similarly, by virtue of this
wrongful conduct going unpunished, others who drink and
drive are in no way deterred.
The Maxey decision stated, however, that the burden will
not be unfairly shifted to the insurer. Rather, the cost will
simply be spread among similiarly situated persons.125 Since
the insurer collects a premium, this whole process can be con-
veniently labelled as freedom of contract and thus remain im-
mune from judicial interference. This argument, nevertheless,
ignores one of the fundamental purposes of punitive damages.
Punitive damages are intended as a personal punishment for
an individual's wrongful conduct and should not be shifted to
the public as policy holders. Furthermore, the Maxey court
"appears . . .to give license to violent, conscious, wanton,
outrageous behavior as long as you can afford to pay for it in
advance." ' 6 Deterrence of wrongful conduct simply is not
achieved when an individual can avoid responsibility for his
reprehensible behavior merely because it is characterized as
"outrageous" rather than intentional. If one of the intended
purposes of punitive damages is personal punishment, then
the defendant must be forced to face the financial impact of a
punitive award. 127  Voluntary intoxication, coupled with
124. Id. at 527.
125. 124 Wis. 2d at 446, 369 N.W.2d at 688.
126. 124 Wis. 2d at 451, 369 N.W.2d at 690 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
127. Although Cieslewicz formed the theoretical background for Maxey, the case
was relied upon improperly. The Cieslewicz case arose out of statutorily defined negli-
gence for violation of a dog bite statute. Cieslewicz, 84 Wis. 2d at 101, 267 N.W.2d at
600. It is clear that the requisite mens rea for punitive damages exceeds that required
for ordinary negligence under the dog bite statute. Thus, while insurance coverage for
punitive damages is inappropriate, coverage for ordinary negligence damages, such as
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causal negligence, warrants greater punishment than do other
intentional torts traditionally warranting an award of punitive
damages. Clearly, public policy should prohibit persons from
protecting themselves against their own voluntary
wrongdoing.
CONCLUSION
Wisconsin has been cautious in extending punitive dam-
ages to unintentional conduct. For many years it refused to
assess punitive damages in the gray area between ordinary
negligence and intentional conduct. Recently, however, the
standards set forth in Wangen v. Ford Motor Co. 128 and Brown
v. Maxey 12 9 have clearly defined that area and have eliminated
the ambiguity created by Bielski v. Schulze. 13 0 Although the
decisions in Wangen and Maxey did not involve drunk driving
claims, they may have their most significant impact in that
context.
Drunk driving has become a social evil that demands im-
mediate and effective treatment in all jurisdictions. The impo-
sition of any doctrine which has the effect of thwarting such
insidious conduct warrants full consideration. Punitive dam-
ages are available in Wisconsin to punish and deter outra-
geous conduct of the kind associated with drinking and
driving. Only when these fundamental purposes are served is
the imposition of a punitive award appropriate. When the
drunk driver is permitted to shift the financial responsibility to
the general public, punitive damages no longer serve their in-
tended purpose. Insurance coverage will undermine the very
nature of punitive damages and leave the act of drunk driving
to be punished by an already ineffectual criminal system. Pu-
nitive damages should be assessed against a drunk driver, but
the assessment necessarily requires the preservation of the
objectives underlying the doctrine.
JAMES A. NIQUET
those arising from violation of the dog bite statute, properly protects a negligent
tortfeasor from unintended or unguarded mishap.
128. 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
129. 124 Wis. 2d 426, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985).
130. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
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